CO129-482 - Public Offices - 1923 — Page 396

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to attack Chekiang and they had respected his wishes, but

that if he were unable to prevent Cheki ang from establishing

in his own Province of Kiangsu the Political Headquarters of

the illegal Government which they were trying to set up he

could not possibly continue to maintain this attitude towards

the Northern Party. I pressed him to define his attitude

quite clearly and he replied that if Parliament assembled in

Fangchow he would regard it as no concern of his and take no

action, but that if it assembled in Shanghai he would give

every facility for a northern attack on Cheklang. I enquired

whether he himself and his own troops would take part in the

attack, and he replied no, he would simply allow northern

troops to pass through Kiangsu, Lu's military strength was,

not very reat and two divisions would be ample to drive him

out of Cheki ang. I asked if he had considered the possibil-

ity that the Foreign powers would not permit fighting in

Shanghai and might intervene with armed forces to prevent it.

It seemed that he was acutely conscious of this danger and I gathered that the plan of operations under consideration was to advance directly on Hangchow by land without coming near

Shanghai. He seemed fully aware that even this would be a

disaster of the first magnitude, and we spent a considerable

time discussing whether any stepe could be taken to avoid hostilities, He pointed out that the sole cause of the crisis

was the assemblage of members of parliament in Shanghai, that Ho Feng Lin, the Occupation Commissioner could prevent this is he chose, and be therefore leaned to the idea that the

Consular Body in Shanghai might effect something by pressure

on Ho Feng Lin. It is certain however that Ho Feng Lin could ■

never be persuaded to adopt drastic measures in apposition to Lu Yung Hsiang's declared policy, and after much discission we failed to arrive at any conclusion as to how the Parliamen- tarians could be kept out of Shanghai if they chose to go there. I asked the Tuchun whether he had considered issuing an official order on the subject in his capacity as Tuchun of

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Kiangsu but for some reason this suggestion did not appeal to

him.

He re-

He was very anxious however to emphasise the point that

Lu Yung Hsiang had provoked the crisis and that if the Powers

wished to protect their vast interests in Shanghai they should

address protests and warnings to Lu as well as offering advice

to the Chihli Party not to commence hostilities. He again laid

stress on his own horroe of war and desire for peace,

peated that no definite decision to attack Chekiang had been

arrived at and he still hoped that the disaster might be averted.

He and his advisors were devoting their most anxious considera-

tion to the problem and he hoped to discuss the question with me

again at an early date,

The conversation which I have reported above leaves

no doubt in my mind that a very critical situation exists. Never-

theless I do not believe that there will be any immediate or

sudden outbreak of hostilities, such, for instance, as a sur-

prise attack by Kiangsu troops on Chekiang. I am confident that

Ch'i Hsieh Yuen is sincere if his professions and will explore

every avenue to peace. The discussions and negotiations may

be prolonged for a considerable period and if, eventually hoa- tilities ensue they will probably take the form of an over-land

attack on Chekiang by an expeditionary force of two Divisions

sent down from the North, In any case however I think that it

would not be premature to consider what steps, if any, could be taken to keep hostilities away from Shanghai and to prevent the use of the Shanghai Nanking Railway by combatants on either

side.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant.

J. T. PRATT

Acting Consul General,